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PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
Following the action of the Supreme Court of the United States
in sustaining as constitutional the Illinois Fair Trade Act,' simi-
lar acts were adopted by the majority of the states, including the
State of Oklahoma.2 In general, such acts permit the producer of
a commodity which bears his trademark, brand or name, to re-
quire his purchasers to agree not to resell the commodity below
a minimum price stipulated by the producer, and it is an act of
unfair competition for any person, whether a party to the agree-
ment or not, knowingly and willfully to sell such commodity at
less than the stipulated minimum price.
Several states have enacted legislation complementary to their
fair trade laws designed to make it a misdemeanor for a person
to sell merchandise or render services below cost for the purpose
of injuring competitors, destroying competition, or inducing pur-
chasers to buy other merchandise or services. California was a
leader in adopting such legislation.' The constitutionality of the
California law was attacked on the ground that it deprived an
individual of his right to dispose of his property at whatever
price he chose, and on the ground that the act was an unlawful
exercise of the state's police power because the means adopted
did not bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of the act. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of California upheld the law.4 A similar
act adopted in Oklahoma in 1941' was declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1949 in the case of Engle.
brecht v. Day.'
'Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U. S. 183 (1936).
2 78 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) §§ 41.45.
3 Cal. Stats. 1935. c. 477. § 3.
4 Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau of Southern Cal. v. National Candy and
Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d. 634, 82 P. 2d. 3 (1938) ; Mering v. Yolo Grocer & Meat
Market, 127 P. 2d. 985 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1942).
5 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Penn. Ed.) §§ 591-597.
C ---- Okla. , 208 P. 2d. 538 (1949).
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The Oklahoma act, known as the Unfair Sales Act, declared the
public policy of the state to be against the advertising or offering
for sale or selling of merchandise by wholesalers or retailers at
less than cost with the intent or effect of inducing the purchase
of other merchandise or unfairly diverting trade from or other-
wise injuring a competitor or injuring the public welfare, where
the result would be to deceive a purchaser, unreasonably restrain
trade, substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. Vio-
lation of this policy was made a misdemeanor, and injunctive re-
lief was provided for any person damaged or threatened with loss
because of a violation.
In Englebrecht v. Day the constitutionality of the Unfair Sales
Act was attacked as violating the due process clauses of the Fed-
eral and State Constitutions. In a 5 to 4 decision the entire act was
declared unconstitutional. The court noted that similar acts adopted
by other states had been held unconstitutional as an unlawful re-
striction of the right of a person to sell his property at whatever
price he can get, or because the business regulated was "not af-
fected with a public interest."7 But these grounds were dismissed
as a basis for holding the Oklahoma act unconstitutional in view
of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
holding that there is no closed category of businesses "affected
with a public interest" and that a court's function under the due
process amendments is to determine in each case whether the regu-
lation is a reasonable exercise of governmental regulatory power.'
The Oklahoma court invalidated the Oklahoma act because
under the wording of the statute it felt that the possibility existed
that a person whose below-cost sales merely had the effect of
injuring a competitor or lessening competition might be convicted
even though he did not have intent of injuring a competitor or
lessening competition. The court stated that enactments similar
to the Okahoma act had been held unconstitutional where they
7 208 P. 2d. at p. 541.
8 Nebbia v. People of the State of New York, 391 U. S. 502 (1934) ; see annotation
in 89 A.L.R. 1469 (1934).
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contained words such as "with intent or effect" or "with the intent,
effect or result." Thus, a Maryland court held unconstitutional a
statute which was in almost the same words as the Oklahoma act,
although the holding seems to have been based on grounds of un-
certainty and unreasonableness.9 The Nebraska court invalidated
a statute prohibiting sales below cost where the effect "may lessen"
competition, no intent or guilty knowledge being required, for
the reason that the act contained no definition of criminal intent
or guilty knowledge and was too uncertain.1" On the other hand,
the Minnesota court upheld a statute which prohibited sales at
less than cost for the purpose or with the effect of injuring compe-
titors or destroying competition, saying:
"Intent to injure is not essential to a violation. This is not fatal to the
act. Sales below cost which have the effect of injuring competition may
be prohibited regardless of intent." 1'
Contrary to the Minnesota decision the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa held that the words "or effect" used in the Oklahoma stat-
ute rendered that portion of the law invalid. The court further
concluded that this portion of the law having been found to be un-
constitutional, the entire act would have to be voided in spite of
the saving clause, since the policy of the act would be altered by
striking the words "or effect" and the rest of the act would not
be a sufficient statement of the Legislature's purpose in enacting
the statute. The court also held invalid as too uncertain a provision
of the act that costs of purchases which could not be justified under
existing market conditions in the state could not be used in deter-
mining the cost of goods under the act.
As a result of the decision in this case the Unfair Sales Act
has been repealed in its entirety by the Oklahoma Legislature and
a new act adopted as emergency legislation. 2 The new act elimi-
9 Daniel Loughran Co., Inc. v. Lord Baltimore Candy and Tobacco Co., 178 Md.
38, 12 A. 2d. 201. 204 (1940).
10 State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607, 609 (1938).
11 MoElbone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N. W. 414, 417 (1940).
12 Okla. Laws 1949. p. 106, §§ 1-11; 15 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) §§ 598.1-
598.11.
